BYU Law Review
Volume 2014 | Issue 3

April 2014

The Justification of Human Rights
David Little

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David Little, The Justification of Human Rights, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 585 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 6

DO NOT DELETE

7/10/2015 12:08 PM

The Justification of Human Rights
David Little 1
This article is divided into two sections. The first part
summarizes arguments regarding the justification of human rights
and the relation of human rights to religion developed more
extensively elsewhere. 2 The second part provides the intellectual
background of the arguments, and is intended to elaborate and
elucidate key ideas contained in the summary.
I
The position defended here follows from an effort to recover and
rehabilitate the natural rights tradition. The idea of natural rights is
taken not to depend on religious belief, though religious belief is
certainly to be protected and accommodated. Rather, the idea of
natural rights rests on an understanding of human nature as
“rational, self-aware, and morally responsible.” 3
This understanding supports a primary notion of subjective
rights, which means that all individuals, simply as individuals, possess
an entitlement to demand (or have demanded for them) a certain
performance or forbearance under threat of sanction for
noncompliance. The understanding also entails certain correlative

1. A version of this summary, entitled “The Justification of Human Rights,” was
delivered at the Twentieth Annual Symposium on International Law and Religion, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 7, 2013.
2. DAVID LITTLE, ESSAYS ON RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO STAND
ON (2015).
3. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997). “A ‘right’ is an entitlement, a due
liberty and power to do or not to do certain things; ‘natural’ means what is neither of human
devising (by law or by agreement) nor conferred by a special command of God [or other
supernatural warrant]. Natural rights are thus entitlements belonging to human nature as such,
in virtue of the superanimal sensibilities and capacities, and therefore to every human being.”
T.E. Jessop, Natural Rights, in DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 225 (1967). As they
developed in the Western Christian tradition, natural rights have been considered “minimal”
or “vestigial” in that they are “left over” after “the fall,” or the willful defection of human
beings from the divinely-appointed standards of human fulfillment. As such, they provide
imperatives of moral restraint and guidance that are necessary but by no means sufficient for
human fulfillment.
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duties and obligations owed by every individual in respect to
protecting the rights of others.
Though moral and legal rights may converge, they are
distinguishable in regard to the character of the applicable sanction:
legal rights are physically enforceable within a system of laws whose
officials possess effective authority over a monopoly of legitimate
force; moral rights are otherwise enforceable, for example, by verbal
censure.
The range of subjective rights under consideration is focused
especially on the protection of certain requirements for survival taken
to be common to every human being. Among other things, natural
rights protect against arbitrary force, which, minimally, is the
infliction of death, physical impairment, severe pain/suffering for
entirely self-serving and/or knowingly mistaken reasons. To refer
only to self-interest or knowingly to deceive in the act of inflicting
death, severe pain, etc., is “morally incomprehensible” because the
reasons given are no reasons at all. 4 This is not an observation about
what human beings happen to believe or not. It is an observation
about what, as rational and moral agents, human beings are able to
believe or not, are able to make sense of or not. It is about the
meaning of moral reason as regards the justification of action
pertaining to critical aspects of human survival. Thus, the random
slaughter of some twenty-six school children and teachers in
Newtown, Connecticut in December 2012 is necessarily regarded as
an act of “senseless violence.”
On this understanding, force (as sanction) may be used in
response to arbitrary force so long as it is demonstrably aimed at
combating and restraining arbitrary force, and does that consistent
with three “rules of reason”: necessity, proportionality, and
effectiveness.

4. A case of “necessity,” in which an innocent party is killed in order for someone else
to survive, is not an exception to this statement since the reasons excusing the act must also
include strong proof that there was no alternative course of action. Such a defense is based not
only on a reference to the self-interest of the one doing the killing. It therefore does not utterly
disregard the interests of the victim, as in a “pure” case of arbitrary force. Still, cases of
necessity are inescapably perplexing from a moral point of view precisely because of the gravity
of the prohibition against hurting others to one’s advantage. As an exhibit of the unavoidable
perplexity, see, for example, Hugo Grotius’s somewhat tortuous discussion of the issue. HUGO
GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS
92, 92–94 (1979).
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Accordingly, it is held that human rights language, consisting of
rights regarded as both moral and legal, rests on such an
understanding. Six points may help clarify this understanding of
human rights language.
1. Such language was drafted and codified in direct response
to a paradigmatic case of arbitrary force, namely, the
record, particularly, of German fascist practices before
and during World War II.
2. It enshrines a basic set of rights, referred to in Article 4 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
as “nonderogable” (nonabridgeable) rights, which
protect everyone against the worst forms of arbitrary
force: extra-judicial killing, torture, “cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,” enslavement,
denials of certain forms of due process, and violations of
freedom of conscience, religion or belief. Protection
against discrimination “solely on the ground of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin” is also
included. 5 We should add to this list what are called
“atrocity crimes,” as codified in the Statute of Rome, the
Charter of the International Criminal Court. Genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, as
defined in the Charter, 6 are all egregious examples of
arbitrary force. Beyond these provisions, there is no list of
nonderogable rights in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but
there are some interesting developments in that
direction. In General Comment 14, the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has enumerated a
set of “core obligations” requisite for guaranteeing
Article 12 of the ICESCR, which guarantees “the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable

5. Articles. 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18, explicitly identified as nonderogable, appear in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR. Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171–78. The prohibition against discrimination is
mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 may also be assumed to be non-derogable.
6. Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3–9. The crime of aggression is not defined in the Charter, but left to further
negotiation and agreement. Still, endeavoring to prohibit aggression is, at the least, an effort to
outlaw “wars of conquest” which regularly exemplified self-serving uses of force.
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standard of physical and mental health,” and it has ruled
that “a State party cannot, under any circumstances
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core
obligations . . . which are non-derogable.” 7 Failure to
enforce these obligations, where feasible, would
constitute arbitrary neglect, a close relative of arbitrary
force.
It adds a set of “derogable” rights (abridgeable under
only the most extreme circumstances, such as
emergencies), like freedom of speech, assembly, and
participation in government, that are designed to assure
maximum protection against the violation of
nonderogable rights.
Though human rights language explicitly obligates
individuals, it also obligates states, 8 meaning that states
exercise force legitimately insofar as they enforce human
rights; otherwise, they administer force illegitimately,
which is to say, arbitrarily.
With the development of the modern state, the
technology of repression has outstripped the organs of
restraint, making all the more urgent the protection of
human rights.
Violations of nonderogable rights and prohibitions
against atrocity crimes are “wrong in themselves”—

7. The core obligations, which every State party is bound to comply with, are such
things as, “ensuring the right to access to health facilities, goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups”; “ensuring access to
minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, and to ensure freedom from
hunger for everyone”; “ensuring access to basic shelter, housing, and sanitation, and an
adequate supply of safe and potable water”; and “ensuring equitable distribution of all health
facilities, goods and services.” Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. DOC.
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. DOC.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev/6
at
85
(2003),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838d0.html.
8. Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR: “Realizing that the individual, having
duties to other individuals and to the community to which [the individual] belongs, is under
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant,” and “Considering the obligations of States under the Charter of the
United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms[.]” Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at pmbl.; Int’l
Covenant on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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”outrages,” that is, against the “conscience of
humankind,” in the updated language of the Preamble to
the UDHR, and they are also a severe threat to “peace in
the world,” as the Preamble also states.
Thus, the moral foundation of human rights language consists of
“natural” rather than “extranatural” or “supernatural” assumptions
concerning the absolute inviolability of prohibitions against arbitrary
force. The idea of natural rights also pertains to the protection of
public goods—health, safety, order, and morals 9— that are assumed
to be of common natural concern as vital requirements for human
survival. The natural grounding in both cases is “secular” in the
sense that it is accessible to and obligatory upon all human beings,
regardless of distinctions “such as religion,” in the words of Article 2
of the UDHR.
Where, then, does religion come in? A key feature of arbitrary
force as practiced by the German fascists was the relentless
imposition by force of a specific set of beliefs upon everyone under
their control. That meant the systematic persecution of all religious
and other forms of dissent. Such actions were a serious violation,
according to a natural rights understanding, because coercion is not
a justification for believing the truth or rightness of anything. When
someone says, “Believe what I tell you or I’ll punish you,” that is a
clear case of arbitrary force—of using force without justification.
Expressions of belief can of course be curtailed by coercion, but that
just begs the question whether such coercion is justified.
In human rights language, therefore, such reasoning protects
“conscience, religion, or belief” against “being subject to coercion
which would impair . . . freedom to adopt a religion or belief of
[one’s] choice.”10
When held up alongside the “natural” justification of human
rights language, the special protection of “conscience, religion, or
belief” (and the practices associated with them), assured by Art. 18
of the UDHR and ICCPR, introduces what I call, a “two-tiered”
system of justification.

9. See Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at 178 (referring
specifically to Article 18, paragraph 3). It is not clear that the term “public morals” has any
determined meaning in human rights jurisprudence.
10. Id. at 178 (Article 18, para. 2).
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The first tier lays down a “natural” (secular) justification that
serves to hold people everywhere accountable to the terms of the
language, backed by a provision for universally legitimate
enforceability (subject to the three “rules of reason”), as well as to
provide standards of protection to which everyone may appeal,
regardless of religious or other identity.
The second tier permits and secures a wide, highly pluralistic
range of “extranatural” justifications for human rights language, and,
of course, for much else related to the broad expanse of human
social life and experience. Second-tier matters are irreducibly
pluralistic because, among other things, they involve intimate,
subjective experience in regard to social attachment, loyalty, and
identity, as well as ultimate sacred commitments not readily given
up. Learning to tolerate and respect without violence these
inescapable differences, by upholding the right to freedom of
conscience, religion, or belief, appears to be both “right in itself”
and critical to achieving peace, as is conclusively shown in the recent
book by Grim and Finke on the connection between violence and
violations of religious freedom. 11
Religious and other forms of second-tier justification are
undoubtedly indispensable for mobilizing adherents to the cause of
human rights. It is also clear that whether it supports or challenges
human rights language, sustained attention to that language by
different communities of conscience, religious or not, can help
identify lacunae or blind spots in the human rights instruments. Such
attention also can assist in finding, where necessary, colloquially
acceptable substitutes for human rights language, and can even bring
about significant change, for example, in interpreting and applying
religious freedom, as has happened as the result of litigation by
minority religions in the United States and elsewhere.
Engagement with human rights matters in these ways illustrates
the importance of the second tier in the ongoing, often complicated,
and sometimes testy negotiations between the two tiers. One
additional function of particular significance, performed by the
second tier, is the process of appealing for conscientious exemptions
from general and neutral laws permitted by human rights

11. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011).
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jurisprudence. 12 Of special note is the requirement that in imposing
restrictions on conscientious belief and practice, the state bears the
burden of proof in demonstrating both that there is a compelling
state interest at stake, and that the restriction is as unintrusive as
possible. In that way tier two serves to limit the reach of tier one,
and to remind it of its obligation of special deference to tier two.
At the same time, all these second tier undertakings are
themselves constrained by the first tier, in accord with the underlying
assumptions of human rights language. Tier-two justifications must
yield to the inviolability of the “natural” prohibitions against
arbitrary force and arbitrary neglect, as well as of the state’s
responsibility, “as prescribed by law” and as is “necessary,” for
protecting the public goods of safety, health, order, and morals, and
the “fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 13
The proposal, in sum, is that human rights language rests on a
natural rights understanding that prescribes a two-tiered theory of
justification. Accordingly, the first tier protects, encourages, and is
limited by the second tier, but it also constrains the second tier in
very important ways.
II
I started attending seriously to the subject of human rights in the
1980s, sparked initially by the election of President Ronald Reagan
at the beginning of the decade. Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter,
together with an active cohort of members of Congress, had given
human rights a central place in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
When Reagan came to office, he made clear his strong opposition to
Carter’s emphasis, and his determination to reconfigure radically the
role of human rights in foreign affairs. At first, it appeared he would
ignore human rights altogether. But gradually he turned to enlisting
human rights in the fight against Communism, with especially
controversial effects in Central America, where Reagan’s policies
were perceived by critics as being much more attentive to the abuses
of the Communists than of their anti-Communist opponents.

12. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought,
Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), July 30, 1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fb22.html.
13. See Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, at 178 (Article 18,
para. 3).
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The intense and continuing debates between Carter and Reagan
supporters at the time piqued my interest in human rights on the
level of law and policy, as well as of theory. It was not, it seemed,
simply a question of how the state and others might interpret and
apply human rights, but also of how, if at all, they could be justified.
That is where the idea of natural rights came in. Whatever other
influences there are, human rights language is undeniably rooted in
the natural rights tradition, associated, as it is, with Western
philosophical and theological thought. The problem was that, at the
time, controversies over the status of natural rights theory were as
acute and seemingly intractable as the controversies over law and
policy. The idea of natural rights is not the only conceivable basis for
supporting human rights, but to refute it successfully removes
human rights’ most venerable foundation.
The idea of natural rights—that human beings “are entitled to
make certain claims by virtue simply of their common humanity” 14—
has long been under assault, going back to the well-known attacks in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by David Hume, Jeremy
Bentham, and Karl Marx. Related attacks continued into the
twentieth century, gaining momentum around the time of the
adoption of the UDHR by the UN General Assembly in December
1948. Anticipating that event, the American Anthropological
Association, for example, submitted a widely noted statement on
human rights to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1947,
denouncing the very idea of universally binding moral claims.
Margaret Macdonald’s influential essay on natural rights, written that
same year, supported this conclusion. 15 Subsequently, similarly
skeptical statements appeared up into the eighties, advanced by
figures like Alasdair MacIntyre 16 and Richard Rorty. 17
In the midst of all the controversy, I, however, remained
unconvinced by the opposition. In 1986, I published an essay on
natural rights and human rights, 18 reexamining the ideas of John
Locke (1632-1704) in some detail, and arguing that Locke’s natural
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Margaret Macdonald, Natural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 40, 40 (1970).
Id.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
RICHARD RORTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982).
David Little, Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative, in
NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 67 (Robert
Davidoff ed.,1986).
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rights theory did not fit the fashionable Marxist model, according to
which rights talk expresses nothing more than bourgeois interests
that are essentially egoistic in character. On the contrary, the whole
point of natural rights for Locke was to protect everyone everywhere
against self-serving rule, something that permitted anyone in
command to “do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the
least liberty to anyone to question or control those who execute his
pleasure[,] . . . and . . . whatsoever he does, whether led by reason,
mistake, or passion, must be submitted to.” Such an arrangement
also allowed individuals to stand as judges in their own case, where
“he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be
so just as to condemn himself for it.” 19 Nor did Locke exempt
economic life from these strictures: Everyone everywhere possesses
“a right to the surplusage of [another’s] goods. . .as will [prevent]
extreme want, where [there is] no means to subsist otherwise.”
Moreover, no one may “justly make use of another’s necessity, to
force him to become his vassal, by withholding that relief God
requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has
more strength can seize upon a weaker [person], master him . . . ,
and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery.” 20
Having endeavored to set the record straight, I proceeded in my
article to mount a constructive case in favor of a natural rights
approach. The line of argument was stimulated by a passing
comment of Locke’s and by some perceptive insights of Gregory
Vlastos 21 and Thomas Nagel 22 about the nature of the conditions
under which pain may or may not be inflicted or relieved.
Commenting on the education of youth, Locke bemoaned the high
esteem bestowed on military conquerors “who for the most part are
but the great butchers of mankind.” Their typical exploits, he says,
tend to encourage an “unnatural cruelty,” “especially the pleasure
[taken] to put anything in pain that is capable of it.” 23 The
implication, supported by the suggestions of Vlastos and Nagel, is

19. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2d Treatise, ch.II, § 13, at 316–
17 (1965).
20. Id. at 1st Treatise, ch.4, § 42, at 205–06.
21. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 51 (Richard B. Brandt
ed., 1962).
22. Thomas Nagel, Limits of Objectivity, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
108 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980).
23. JAMES L. AXTELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 226–27 (1968).
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that giving self-serving reasons for inflicting pain or for taking
advantage of someone in pain by withholding relief is the essence of
cruelty, something morally unthinkable or indisputably “wrong in
itself.”
In this way the idea of a natural right can, I contended, be
justified. The argument provides warrant for the notion of a
subjective entitlement possessed by all individuals, simply as
individuals, to demand (or have demanded for them) that no one of
them shall be subjected to arbitrary force or arbitrary neglect under
threat of sanction for noncompliance. Given that a claim of this sort
is meant to be respected universally, certain correlative duties and
obligations so to respect the right are, by implication, owed by every
individual to every other individual.
The right is “natural” because any mature, competent human
being, “without [that is] distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property birth or other status,” 24 is expected to recognize the
blatant incongruity, and, hence, patent unjustifiability, of inflicting
pain or taking advantage of those in pain for self-serving motives,
and, consequently, is obligated to refrain from acting in that way.
Anyone reliably suspected of so acting is therefore liable to
sanction—subject, of course, to the three “rules of reason”:
necessity, proportionality, and effectiveness. That is true whether, as
Locke implies, the motives are disguised by reason, or are the result
of a knowing or negligent mistake or simply of passion. Indeed,
Locke’s whole theory of government, including the design for
administering legal sanctions, is grounded in this understanding. “I
easily grant,” he says, that civil government is the proper remedy for
the inconveniences of the state of nature” where “self-love will make
men partial to themselves and to their friends,. . .and that ill-nature,
passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others[.]” 25
In short, the ultimate objective of government is that everyone “may
be restrained from invading others’ rights and from doing hurt to
one another, and [that] the law of nature be observed, which wills
the peace and preservation of all mankind.” 26

24. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 2 (1948).
25. LOCKE, supra note 17, at 316, 2d Treatise, ch. II, § 13.
26. Id. at 312, ch. II, § 7.
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Around the time the article supporting natural rights appeared, I
published a related essay on the Puritan dissident and founder of the
Rhode Island colony, Roger Williams (1603-1683), in which I
analyzed and promoted his defense of freedom of conscience and
separation of church and state. 27 I believed the effort was important
not only because Williams’s arguments were intrinsically appealing,
as well as anticipating some of Locke’s ideas, but also because
Williams had, for the most part, been so badly misunderstood by
those who should know better. In particular, there was (and
continues to be) the widespread failure to understand the Calvinist
roots of Williams’s thinking, a point I introduced in the essay, but
went on to develop more extensively in subsequent writings. 28 The
key idea is the distinction between the two tables of the Decalogue,
or the Ten Commandments. The article focused on the deep and
abiding tension in Reformed Christianity, beginning with Calvin
himself. Early in his career, Calvin taught that it was not the state’s
job to enforce the first table—matters of religious belief or
conscience, but only the second table—moral and civic matters,
whose principle is that “all individuals should preserve their rights”
in regard to life, liberty, and property, or what Calvin often called
natural rights. This teaching assumed a distinction between the
“inward forum” or conscience that should not be coerced, and the
“outward forum” or affairs of state that should. Later in his career,
Calvin sharply altered his position, authorizing the state to regulate
the first as well as the second table.
Williams’s position on freedom of conscience and church-state
relations was, in large part, simply an elaboration of the early Calvin,
whereas his opponents, the authorities of the Massachusetts Bay
colony who expelled him, sided with the later Calvin. In defending
himself, Williams provided extensive commentary on the two tables
of the Decalogue, on the distinction between the jurisdictions of the
“inward” and “outward” forums, and, like Calvin and other
members of the Reformed tradition, on the importance of
constitutional government, including protection of “natural and civil
rights and liberties” that make up the “natural freedom of the
27. David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION
3 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985).
28. David Little, Roger Williams and the Puritan Background of the Establishment
Clause, in T. JEREMY GUNN & JOHN WITTE, JR., NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION:
AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 100 (2012).
AND STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER
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people.” Noteworthy was his ability to advance his views in the
Rhode Island colony by successfully excluding any reference to
religious privileges in the Charter of 1644 and the Civil Code 1647,
and by explicitly codifying an expansive right to freedom of
conscience in the Charter of 1663. His mode of discourse,
intermixing extensive biblical exposition with “free-standing” appeals
to reason, nature, and experience is very much in the Calvinist
tradition, starting with Calvin himself. 29
While for Williams the idea of temporal government is divinely
ordained, he leaves no doubt that the “power, might or authority”
of particular governments “is not religious, Christian, etc., but
natural, humane, and civil.” 30 Clearly implied is a notion of “secular”
or “public reason,” according to which any well-ordered government
should be conducted. The notion rests on “natural” rather than
“extranatural” or “supernatural” assumptions concerning the
protection of public goods, like health, safety, and order, taken to be
of universal concern as vital requirements of human survival.
It also rests on the idea that any attempt by an earthly
government to regulate coercively matters of conscience or belief,
beside those that incite to a violation of public safety or order,
constitutes an act of arbitrary or unjustified force—of “soul rape,” as
Williams repeatedly calls it. “The binding and rebinding of
conscience [by force], contrary [to] or without its own persuasion,
so weakens and defiles it that it . . . loseth its strength and the very
nature of a common honest conscience.”31 The essence of conscience
is inward consent based on a conviction of truth and right. Physical
force, in and of itself, cannot produce that. Belief depends on reasons
consisting of argument and evidence, and the threat of force, as in a
case of robbery or rape, is not a reason in the proper sense because it
lacks justification. Thus, the only “weapons” suitably employed in
the inward forum are “spiritual,” namely appeals and arguments
subject to rational standards, whose object is consensual or heartfelt
agreement. Accordingly, “forcing the conscience of any person” is
action that deforms conscience by inducing hypocrisy, narrowmindedness, or self-betrayal.

29. See David Little, Calvin and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEOLOGY 411 (2009).
30. 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 398 (1963).
31. 4 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 209 (1963).
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Consequently, Williams favored a broadly pluralistic society
including all manner of Protestants, Catholics, 32 Jews,
“Mohammedans,” and “pagans” or Native Americans, and even
those “who turn atheistical and irreligious.” By no means did he
support protection only for those groups manifesting a
“hyperindividualistic,” strongly “protestant” religious outlook, as has
been alleged. On the contrary, Williams advocated accommodating
as diverse a range as possible in matters of religion and conscience,
urging only that the rights and duties, the benefits and burdens, of
citizenship be kept scrupulously separate from such considerations.
As with Locke, the overriding objective of such an arrangement is
“keeping the peace.” “Among those that profess the same God and
Christ as Papists and Protestants, or the same Muhammed as the
Turks and Persians, . . . civil peace would [not] be broken
(notwithstanding their differences in religion) were it not for the
bloody doctrine of persecution, which alone breaks the bonds of civil
peace, and makes spiritual causes the causes of their bloody
dissensions . . . .”33
It is true that throughout his lifetime, and well into the
eighteenth century, Williams’s ideas had little impact outside Rhode
Island. However, as I argued in the article, that all changed around
the time of the American Revolution and the founding of the
Republic by way of Williams’s influence on Locke and Isaac Backus
(1724-1806), the intrepid lobbyist for religious liberty at the time of
the Constitutional convention. Williams’s impact on Backus is
indisputable, since Backus wrote what amounted to an early
biography of Williams, and regularly cited him, even though he was
not as radical as Williams. Backus sought to remove established
religion such as existed in many of the colonies at the time, but he
still advocated support for a form of civil religion requiring a
religious test for public office. Williams’s influence on Locke is a
more uncertain matter, though there is significant scholarly support

32. Williams does flirt at one point with the acceptability of requiring the display of
special insignia on members of religious groups like the Catholics in protecting national
security, though he does that in the context of a discussion of reasons for trusting and
respecting Catholics, and, in fact, for considering some extremist Protestant sectarians as a
greater threat to national security than Catholics. Id. at 313–15.
33. Roger Williams, Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody, in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 183 (James Calvin Davis ed., 2008).

597

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/10/2015 12:08 PM

2014

for it, 34 and the similarities of argument in regard to natural rights,
freedom of conscience, and the separation of church and state are
striking. Nevertheless, whatever Williams’s impact on Locke, Locke,
like Backus, was not as liberal as Williams, arguing that atheists,
Catholics, and Muslims should not be accorded freedom of
conscience.
Since I wrote those two essays in the 1980s, the literature on
natural rights, including the connection to freedom of conscience,
has grown substantially, often in appreciation of certain lines of
argument in the tradition. Brian Tierney’s book, The Idea of Natural
Rights, 35 published in 1997, revolutionized study of the topic by
refuting the popular belief that natural rights represent a “deformed
version of Christian ideas.” Tierney also rejected the assertions that
natural rights glorify egoistic individualism (as Marx claimed), and
emphasize an anti-religious bias derived from the Enlightenment (as
many still claim). Rather, the natural rights are to be understood as
the product of a “great age of creative jurisprudence” in twelfth- and
thirteenth-century medieval Europe at the hands of inventive canon
lawyers and monastic theologians whose moral and legal theories
“may still prove of value in our political discourse.” 36 Of special
importance in anticipating Locke’s arguments against arbitrary force
is Tierney’s description of the right of self-defense—considered in
the tradition as “the greatest of rights”—namely, “a natural
inalienable right [inhering] in individuals and communities . . . that
could be exercised by subjects against a tyrannical ruler.” 37
Judith Shklar’s influential essay, “The Liberalism of Fear,”
appearing in 1989, 38 strongly reinforced the approach I was
developing. She claimed that the critical feature of a liberal theory of
government is the prevention of “arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary,
and unlicensed acts of force [including] habitual and pervasive acts of
34. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY, 371 n.18 (2008) (noting that Quentin Skinner
confirmed that “Williams [was] a prominent part of the literature . . . with which Locke was
certainly familiar”); cf. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN
AMERICA 196 (1991), and WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA’S
FOUNDATION IN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 176 (2003).
35. TIERNEY, supra note 3.
36. Id. at 27, 42
37. Id. at 314.
38. Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21, 21–
38 (Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., 1989).
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cruelty and torture performed by military, paramilitary, and police
agents in any regime.” 39 She eloquently rephrased and updated
Locke’s view, which I had highlighted in my 1986 essay. She also
contended that the liberalism of fear “certainly does begin with a
summum malum, which all of us know and would avoid if only we
could”—namely, the deliberate infliction of physical and emotional
pain on the weak in order to satisfy the interests of the strong. 40
Shklar did caution against too readily drawing moral conclusions
from the fact that “the fear of systematic cruelty is so universal,”
since stating facts about beliefs does not prove they are morally right
or wrong. 41 However, that difficulty is avoided, as it seemed to me,
since the implication of Locke’s theory is not, finally, about what
human beings do believe, but about what they are capable of
believing; not about reporting facts, but about what makes sense,
about what can be believed, in taking a position on right and wrong.
The Realm of Rights by Judith Jarvis Thomson, published in
1990, 42 gave new energy to the philosophical defense of natural
rights, arguing in a way consistent with the tradition that “there is
no possible world in which an act’s being an instance of ‘causes a
person pain’ is irrelevant to the question whether it is wrongful.” 43
Going further, she advances a proposition very close to the
conclusion drawn earlier about Locke: That non-trivial necessary
moral truths exist such as, “[o]ne ought not torture babies to death
for fun.” 44
As to Locke scholarship, John Simmons’s volume, The Lockean
Theory of Rights, 45 appearing in 1992, goes a long way toward
showing both that Locke had “a developed and consistent theory of
rights,” which deserves to be taken seriously, and that his theory
serves not only “as a viable foundation for his political philosophy,”
but also “may serve as a viable foundation for ours.” 46
John Witte’s book, The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion,
and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism (2007), illuminates
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18–19.
A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992).
Id. at 354.
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the way the Calvinist tradition carried forward the natural rights
narrative, more or less picking up where Tierney left off. Unlike
Tierney, Witte also shows the relevance of the natural rights tradition
to questions of freedom of conscience and religious pluralism. This
tradition is both the more restrictive approach of the later Calvin,
Theodore Beza, and Johannes Althusius, as well as the more
inclusive approach of John Milton, a friend and ally, personally and
intellectually, of Roger Williams.
Martha Nussbaum’s impressive study, Liberty of Conscience: In
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008),
compellingly commends Williams for his distinctive contribution to
guaranteeing equal freedom of conscience in the American
experience. To her credit, she correctly emphasizes Williams’s
appeals to natural or “secular” reason, which are certainly there.
Unfortunately, she ignores the importance of his supplementary
appeals to scripture and doctrine, as well as the central place in his
thought of natural rights thinking, impressed upon him by the
Calvinist tradition in which he stood. Her failure to appreciate the
role of natural rights is especially surprising since she highlighted it
in an earlier book, 47 and has proceeded, revisionistically, to be sure,
to appropriate it in developing her “capabilities” approach to social
reform and development.
But most important in the effort to bring natural rights and
human rights together—my overall objective in the 1986 article—
was a book published in 1999 by Johannes Morsink, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent. 48
Morsink indicates that at the very start of the process of drafting the
UDHR, one delegation proposed to begin the document with the
following words, “Recognizing that the United Nations has been
established for the specific purpose of enthroning the natural rights
of man . . . .” 49
Although the words were not adopted, Morsink thinks they
support the presumption that there is “some kind of connection”
between “natural rights philosophies,” which Morsink identifies with

47. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 9–92 (2006).
48. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999).
49. Id. at 282.
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the Enlightenment, and the language adopted in the UDHR. 50 It is
not that the drafters self-consciously and intentionally attempted to
enshrine natural rights theory. For the most part, they were not
interested in philosophical questions and wanted to minimize, as
much as possible, what they took to be loaded terms. 51 Rather, they
shared, usually unreflectively, certain moral assumptions with the
natural rights tradition. One assumption was that “by nature”
everyone everywhere possesses an “inalienable” set of moral rights
that are independent of, and prior to, any legal rights temporal
governments may bestow, thereby constituting a standard for
judging the conduct of government, and especially the
administration of force. 52
Another assumption was the expectation of standard moral
reactions to events of a certain kind. Drafters did not object to the
language of the Preamble, “Whereas disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged
the conscience of mankind,” because they all shared the view that
any other way of assessing the practices of the Nazis before and
during World War II was unthinkable. 53 More than anything else, it
was their common “outrage,” prompted by the “horrors of the war,”
and dramatized, particularly, by the Holocaust, that energized and
guided the drafting of the UDHR. 54 In his careful analysis of some
of the articles of the UDHR, Morsink shows how the final wording
was consciously and specifically formulated in reaction to what were
considered egregious violations in regard to taking life, inflicting
pain and suffering, enslaving, and so on. 55 Morsink states that one
reason the drafters did not draw on “Enlightenment precedents” is
that they “had no need for examples from the Enlightenment . . . .
The horrors of World War II gave them all . . . they needed to be
justified” in producing the UDHR. 56
Part of the underlying expectation in face of the “outrages”
under consideration was an assumption concerning the two-fold
foundation of rights language. In the first place, “the drafters surely
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 290–295.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 27, 91, 300.
Id. at 36–58.
Id. at 320.
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thought that proclaiming [the] Declaration would serve the cause of
world peace,” a sentiment strictly in line with the thinking of
Williams and Locke. 57 However, Morsink continues, “[T]hey did not
think of the human rights they proclaimed as only or merely a means
to that end.” 58 They also thought “these rights have an independent
grounding [for] the members of the human family to whom they
belong and who possess them as birthrights. If this were not so, a
government could torture people (or violate any other right) as long
as it was thought . . . to serve the cause of . . . peace.” 59
Morsink does not call attention to a third assumption concerning
a connection between natural rights and human rights over the
question of freedom of conscience, but a connection would be hard
to miss in light of what he says about the understanding underlying
the provisions in the UDHR. “There is no presumption in the
Declaration that the morality of human rights requires any kind of
religious foundation. . . . [T]he drafters went out of their way to
avoid having the Declaration make a reference to God or to man’s
divine origin. . . . [It] gives everyone total freedom of religion,
including the right not to have one.”60
As indispensable as Morsink’s discussion is for connecting natural
rights and human rights, it is seriously deficient in that he unduly
limits the natural rights tradition to the Enlightenment. Thanks to
Tierney, we now know how mistaken that view is, as are beliefs that
natural rights are to be understood as invariably egoistic and antireligious.
Morsink also causes confusion when he states that the drafters
paid no heed to natural rights thinking since all they needed was
their impression of “the horrors of World War II” to feel justified in
producing the UDHR. The point is that the drafters’ reaction to the
horrors of World War II was a prime example of natural rights
thinking. The practices designed and implemented by Hitler and the
German Nazi regime exemplified paradigmatically “disregard and
contempt” for the fundamental moral prohibitions aimed at
punishing and preventing arbitrary force (and its relative, arbitrary
neglect). Those prohibitions underlie all three of the common

57.
58.
59.
60.
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assumptions just laid out between natural rights and human rights:
Priority of moral rights over legal rights; the expectation of standard
moral reactions to events of a certain kind, including convictions
concerning the two-fold justification of basic rights—promoting
world peace, and considering the violation of basic rights “wrong in
itself”; and the “natural” (secular) grounding of basic rights.
In keeping with our summary of a proposed way of justifying
human rights and the relation of human rights to religion, we have
argued that a common theme of great importance brings the natural
rights tradition and human rights language together. That is a
fundamental commitment to a set of moral and legal rights designed
to combat and restrain arbitrary force (and arbitrary neglect),
whether manifested as inflicting death, suffering, or pain; or failing
to prevent or relieve them for purely self-serving reasons; or
coercively regulating expressions of conscience, religion; or belief
that pose no threat to public order, safety or health. In regard to the
subject of religion and human rights, we hope, in a word, to have
provided some “ground to stand on.”
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